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THE DEFENDANT HAS ATTACKED THE EVIDENT 
BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING DENYING 
HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
The State argues that the Defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his 
jury conviction where he "attacks only the ground abandoned by the prosecutor 
and not the evident basis for the Court's ruling" (Appellee brief pg 10). The 
State then suggests that the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to 
suppress on the grounds that the police officer could have arrested the 
Defendant for the offense of Interference with an Officer, thereby justifying a 
search incident to arrest. (Appellee brief pg 8) 
The trial court listened to and took under advisement the Defendant's 
motion to suppress after memoranda were submitted and arguments of counsel 
were made. (R. 239 / 33). Unfortunately the trial court never rendered a 
written decision, but simply allowed the evidence seized pursuant to the search 
to be introduced before the jury (R. 239 /115-121 and State Exh. #1 & 2). 
The State now argues that the trial court denied the Defendant's 
motion on the grounds that an objective review of the evidence would support 
the officer's arrest for an offense of Interference with Arresting Officer. The 
trial court made no such ruling. The trial court included the evidence without 
any written or verbal holding. If the trial court had made such a ruling, that 
1 
ruling would also be in error due to the fact that the totality of the evidence 
regarding the actions of the defendant simply does not constitute the elements 
of that offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 provides: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful Order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain 
from performing any act that would impede the arrest or 
detention. 
A cursory analysis of the allegations regarding the Defendant's actions 
clearly shows that these actions do not fall within the parameters of this 
offense. Subsection (1) requires the use of force or any weapon, and there is 
simply no evidence which would indicate that a weapon was either used or 
displayed. 
Subsection (2) would require the Defendant to refuse to engage in an act 
ordered by the officer to effectuate an arrest. This also did not occur. The 
2 
evidence, in light most favorable to the State, indicates that the Defendant 
asked the officer, "Why — why are you stopping us, those kinds of things." 
The officer testified the Defendant's conversation, "at one point turned vulgar 
and I remember him cursing and not letting me talk to Ms. Wright." The 
prosecutor then asked the officer, "What did you do in response to this?" to 
which the officer answered that he simply asked the Defendant for his 
identification. (R. 239 / 7,8) These actions certainly do not constitute a refusal 
by the Defendant to "perform any act... necessary to effect the arrest or 
detention; and made by a peace officer." If the trial court were to have ruled 
that an individual violates §76-8-305 by asking an officer the reason for being 
stopped or uttering a curse word in front of an officer, then our society has 
devolved into a Gestapo state. 
This Court has understood this concept and properly recognized 
constitutional freedom of expression, even as applied to a police officer, in the 
case of Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah App., 1990) where the 
Court stated, 
Because Logan City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is susceptible of 
application to substantial amounts of speech which, though 
perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is 
constitutionally overbroad and facially invalid. (Attached as 
Addendum 1) 
3 
if ihe State is relying on the Defendant's cursing to substantiate the 
offense of Interfering with Arresting Officer, that reliance would fly in direct 
contravention with well-established law regarding an mem uaai cursing at an 
officer as set lonr, above. 
1 1l:ie fn lal possible ac I: that t the Defend ai it c :>"i ild engage in as a iolation 
,-<;,.. ,: .,n -ls contained in subsection (3) which states that "the arrested 
person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that 
would impede the arrest or detention" could constitute this offense. Again there 
is simply no evidence which unuto support this allegation. 
sc-..rJc. . ,„:,: n;i_ ;ha: i ^ !>'.;!lMKi;'^ :^  .v ^ iru r, • *• - ^vsiing 
officer, even though that officer acknowledged that the Defendant did not 
interfere with an arrest, but "he was interfering with [his] investigation talking 
with the driver" ((sic) R. 239/17). The Defendant's actions therefore simply do 
not fn \-;Lmn me parameters o, Liw siatuk- I:K,; ;ne Mate is suggesting supports 
the trial coi if t" s denia 1 of the Defendai it's mo tion to si lppress 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing the Defendant respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse the trial court decision and remand for further proceedings after 
excluding the requested evidence. 
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Logan City v. Huber 
Utah App., 1990 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
LOGAN CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph Lowell HUBER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890093-CA. 
Jan. 17, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted, in the First Circuit Court, 
Cache County, Burton H. Harris, J., of disorderly 
conduct and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Jackson, J., held that disorderly conduct statute pro-
scribing obscene or abusive language spoken with 
intent "to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, 




[1] Municipal Corporations 268 €^>594(2) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X Police Power and Regulations 
268X(A) Delegation, Extent, and Exercise of 
Power 
268k594 Ordinances and Regulations in 
General 
268k594(2) k. Form and Sufficiency in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Municipal disorderly conduct ordinance proscribing 
obscene or abusive language spoken with intent "to 
cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad, insofar as it punished a signi-
ficant amount of protected verbal expression, in-
cluding criticism and challenge, vulgarities and re-
monstrations, whether it was directed at police of-
ficer, ordinary citizen, or one who was not even 
present, without regard to its likely impact on any 
Page 1 
actual addressee. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 
[2] Municipal Corporations 268 €=>594(2) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268X Police Power and Regulations 
268X(A) Delegation, Extent, and Exercise of 
Power 
268k594 Ordinances and Regulations in 
General 
268k594(2) k. Form and Sufficiency in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 268k594) 
Court would not construe the term "abusive lan-
guage" in unconstitutionally overbroad disorderly 
conduct ordinance to encompass only fighting 
words; it was municipality's job, not court's, to 
fashion narrowly drawn ordinance criminalizing 
unprotected speech. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 
*1372 A.W. Lauritzen, Logan City, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Cheryl A. Russell, Logan City, for plaintiff-re-
spondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Ralph Lowell Huber was convicted by a jury of dis-
orderly conduct, a misdemeanor, *1373 in violation 
of a Logan City ordinance. On appeal, he chal-
lenges the constitutionality of the ordinance on its 
face and as applied. We reverse. 
In the early morning hours of December 11, 1988, 
Officers Russell Roper and Greg Monroe were on 
alcohol enforcement detail. They were parked off 
the road in their unmarked patrol car when they 
heard and saw a small car approaching them. The 
car made a wide turn at the corner and started to 
slide on the pea gravel in the road. The car acceler-
ated and went past the police vehicle, at a speed es-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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timated by the officers at 35-38 m.p.h. in a 25 
m.p.h. zone, then braked to a stop at a red light on 
Main Street and Third North in Logan City, Utah. 
Officer Roper followed and pulled up behind the 
car at the light. 
When the semaphore turned green and the small car 
proceeded through the intersection, Officer Roper 
turned on his red spotlight and followed the small 
car as it turned in to the parking lot of defendant 
Huber's business. As the officers alighted, Huber 
got out of his car and walked briskly up to the door 
of his building. Officer Monroe called to Huber and 
said they wanted to talk to him. In an exchange of 
words lasting approximately two to three minutes, 
Roper first asked Huber how he was, and Huber 
turned to face the officers, who were three to four 
feet away. He told the police they were trespassing 
on his property, took a step closer and said, "Now 
git," and pointed in the direction they should go. 
Roper then asked Huber for his driver's license. 
Huber refused, saying, "Fuck you, I'm not going to 
give it to you." The request was repeated several 
times and Huber continued to refuse, variously re-
sponding, "Fuck you," "This is bullshit," "You 
know who I am," and "You guys are harassing me, 
you piss me right off." During this time, Huber's 
voice was raised, he was using unspecified "hand 
actions," and he stepped closer to Roper, talking 
directly in his face. After Roper again explained to 
Huber that they had observed him speeding, Mon-
roe took over the conversation. Although Monroe 
testified that he intervened because he thought there 
was going to be a fight, he testified to no acts other 
than the use of these words in a loud voice and 
Huber's proximity to Roper at this point. Roper ex-
plained that, once his partner stepped in and took 
over the conversation with Huber, he simply backed 
away and returned to the patrol car to summon as-
sistance. He then rejoined Monroe at the front of 
Huber's car at some point after Huber had turned 
over his driver's license to Monroe. 
The following two- to three-minute exchange took 
place next between Monroe and Huber, immedi-
Page2 
ately preceding Huber's arrest,FN1 as captured on 
Monroe's tape recorder (all ellipses appear in the 
transcript admitted into evidence): 
FN1. Monroe estimated the total elapsed 
time from the point at which the officers 
pulled in behind Huber's car in the busi-
ness parking lot and the point at which he 
was arrested at approximately five to six 
minutes. 
Huber: ... You're two blocks down the road. 
Monroe: We weren't two blocks down the road. 
Huber: You were clear the hell down by Taco 
Time. 
Monroe: Do you want to know where we really 
were? When you came around the corner, when 
you came around the corner awfully fast, right at 
the road here, we were parked just off the road. 
But we do need to see your driver's license. 
Huber: ... This is my property and you're on it 
without my permission, and that's it that's what it 
boils down to. If it.... I'm tired of being harrassed. 
Monroe: We need to see your registration too 
p l ea se . ^ 
FN2. At trial, Monroe clarified that Huber 
had turned over his driver's license at this 
point, even though the officer's next line in 
the recorded conversation makes it seem 
that Huber had not yet done so. 
Huber: Bullshit! Now look you're on my property 
this is my building, I haven't*1374 done anything 
wrong, I want to be left alone. I'm tired of this 
harrassment, because I come out of my bar and 
you guys start harassing, and I don't want it. 
Monroe: We need to see your driver's license, 
and the registration. 
Huber: The registration is current it's on the back, 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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you're going to run it through the radio, you can 
find out just as quick as I can. 
Monroe: Look, Mr. Huber, we are trying to be 
decent here. 
Huber: No it's because, what time is it, because 
you have nothing else to do. And that's it. 
Monroe: In just about 2 seconds, we're not going 
to be decent okay. We need to see the registra- tion. 
Huber: Fine, fine, fineJFN3] Get your lights out.... 
FN3. At this point in the exchange, Huber 
either leaned into or sat down in his car to 
get his registration out of the glove box. 
He handed the registration over to Monroe 
shortly thereafter, but Monroe testified that 
Huber's arrest was a "foregone conclusion" 
by that point. 
Monroe: We'll be with you in just a secondJFN4J 
FN 4. According to Roper, after Monroe 
said this to Huber the two officers left him 
and walked around to the back of Hubert 
car and "made a decision that the only way 
we could resolve this situation would be in 
Mr. Huber's arrest." 
Huber: This is a bunch of crap, you know what 
the car it [sic] it's mine, it's always here. Get your 
fiickin' light out of my car, goddamnitJ[[[FN5^ 
You guys piss me right off. 
FN5. Monroe testified that this last vulgar-
ity, which came as his partner scanned the 
interior of Huber's car with a high-powered 
flashlight, "was the straw that broke the 
camel's back." 
Monroe: Here's the deal Mr. Huber, you are un-
der arrest for disorderly conduct. We are going to 
jail. Put your hands behind your back. Turn 
around and put your hands behind your back. 
After he was taken to the police station and booked, 
Huber posted a cash bond and walked home. In a 
two-count information, Huber was charged with 
speeding FN6 and with violating a municipal ordin-
ance that renders a person guilty of disorderly con-
duct if, 
FN6. The jury acquitted Huber on the 
speeding charge. 
[ijntending to cause public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk there-
of: 
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language 
or makes obscene gestures in a public placef.] 
Logan City, Utah, Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) (Feb. 
19, 1987).FN7 
FN7. The same language • appears in the 
state law prohibiting disorderly conduct, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102(1 )(b)(iv) 
(1978). Neither enactment has been con-
strued by an appellate court of this state. 
We note that Huber was not charged 
with violating other subsections of the 
ordinance, such as 12-8-9(2)(A), under 
which a person with the requisite intent 
is guilty of disorderly conduct if he 
"engages in fighting or in violent, tumul-
tuous, or threatening behavior." We, 
therefore, address ourselves only to the 
subsection of the ordinance under which 
he was charged. 
It is apparent that the challenged subsection of the 
Logan City ordinance criminalizes speech, i.e., ob-
scene or abusive language spoken with the requisite 
intent. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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speech do not permit the government to punish the 
use of words or language outside of "narrowly lim-
ited classes of speech." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 
U.S. 518, 521-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105-06, 31 
L.Ed.2d 408 (1972); see N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 
(1963) ("Because First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive, government may regu-
late in the area only with narrow specificity."). 
Those limited classes of unprotected speech, enu-
merated in State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 612 
P.2d 630, 634 (1980) and cases cited therein, *1375 
include the obscene, the libelous,™8 fighting 
words, and certain language that incites. 
FN8. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 
(Utah 1988). 
The class of unprotected speech relevant in the in-
stant case comprises "fighting words,,,FN9 which 
the United States Supreme Court has, since its de-
cision in Chaplinsfy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), consist-
ently defined as words that by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace by the person to whom they are dir-
ectly addressed. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2509, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987); 
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133, 
94 S.Ct. 970, 972, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974); Good-
ing, 405 U.S. at 525, 92 S.Ct. at 1107. Even if a 
statute or ordinance aims at penalizing an unprotec-
ted class of speech, it "must be carefully drawn or 
be authoritatively construed to punish only unpro-
tected speech and not be susceptible of application 
to protected expression." Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522, 
92 S.Ct. at 1106. 
FN9. Respondent does not seriously con-
tend that Huber's use of the word "fuckin' " 
as an adjective or the epithet "fuck you" is 
unprotected by the first amendment be-
cause obscene. In the context of determin-
ing what obscene expression is not protec-
ted by the federal Constitution, the United 
States Supreme Court has consistently con-
cluded that this term is not obscene. For 
example, in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 
94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973), the 
defendant was immediately arrested for 
disorderly conduct by a sheriff who heard 
him yell "We'll take the fuckin' street 
later" at a public demonstration. The Court 
held that any contention that this speech 
was obscene and, therefore, punishable 
"would not be tenable." Id at 107, 94 S.Ct. 
at 328; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1785-86, 29 L.Ed.2d 
284 (1971) (same word printed on jacket 
not obscene because not, "in some signific-
ant way, erotic"). 
In this appeal, Huber contends, inter alia, that Lo-
gan City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is overbroad and 
vague and, therefore, facially invalid as violative of 
the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. An overbroad enactment is one "which does 
not aim specifically at evils within the allowable 
area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps 
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary cir-
cumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of 
speech or the press." Waters v. UcGuriman, 656 
F.Supp. 923, 925 (E.D.Pa.1987) (quoting Thornhill 
M Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 
S4L.Ed. 1093(1940)). 
Faced with overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a 
statute or ordinance, our first task is to determine 
whether the enactment makes unlawful a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Hoff-
man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 
L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); see New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 
1113 (1982) (only substantially overbroad statute 
may be invalidated on its face); Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).FN10 If it 
does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail 
and we should then examine the facial vagueness 
challenge. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494, 102 
S.Ct. at 1191. If it does, it may be held facially in-
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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valid even if it also has legitimate application. City 
of Houston, 107 S.Ct. at 2508. 
FN 10. Like the court in Willden, 768 P.2d 
at 458, we assume, arguendo, the applicab-
ility of federal first amendment standing 
principles in Utah courts. 
[1] We agree with appellant that Logan City Ordin-
ance 12-8-9(2)(D), on its face, is unconstitutionally 
overbroad. The ordinance proscribes obscene or ab-
usive language spoken with intent "to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly 
creating a risk thereof." In Gooding, 405 U.S. at 
519, 92 S.Ct. at 1104, an ordinance punishing 
"opprobrious words or abusive language tending to 
cause a breach of the peace" was held facially over-
broad. As the court pointed out, the ordinary dic-
tionary definition of "abusive" gives it far greater 
reach than "fighting words." According to Web-
ster's Third International Dictionary 8 (1986), a 
person is "abusive" if he or she employs "harsh in-
sulting language." However, much of the speech 
that can be categorized as harsh *1376 insulting 
language does not involve words that "by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace." Lewis, 415 U.S at 133, 94 
S.Ct. at 972 (invalidating as overbroad an ordinance 
making it unlawful "for any person wantonly to 
curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious 
language" toward or about a police officer). See, 
e.g., Cavazos v. State, 455 N.E.2d 618 
(Ind.App.1983) (epithet "asshole" directed at police 
officer did not constitute fighting words). Further-
more, as the intent required as an element of the of-
fense makes clear, the abusive language penalized 
by Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is expressly not limited 
to harsh insulting words "which by their very utter-
ance ... tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace," as required by Chaplinsfy and its progeny. 
The ordinance, far from being narrowly drawn, ap-
plies to all harsh insulting words that recklessly 
create a risk of inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, 
not just to those that "have a direct tendency to 
cause acts of violence by the person to whom, indi-
vidually, the remark is addressed." Chaphnsky, 315 
U.S. at 573, 62 S.Ct. at 770; see State v. Swoboda, 
658 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Indeed, 
the Logan City ordinance does not even require that 
the abusive language be directed at the person who 
hears it, another key characteristic of "fighting 
words." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573, 62 S.Ct. at 
770; see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08, 94 
S.Ct. 326, 328-29, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (per curi-
am); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-21, 91 
S.Ct. 1780, 1785-86, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309, 60 S.Ct. 
900, 905-06, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). In short, the or-
dinance unconstitutionally punishes as disorderly 
conduct a significant amount of protected verbal 
expression, including criticism and challenge, vul-
garities and remonstrations, whether it is directed at 
a police officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is 
not even present, without regard for its likely im-
pact on any actual addressee.™11 As the facts in 
this case graphically demonstrate, Logan City Or-
dinance 12-8-9(2)(D), like the overbroad ordinance 
struck down in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 
U.S. at 134, 94 S.Ct. at 973, confers virtually unres-
trained power on police to arrest and charge per-
sons with a violation. See id. at 135, 94 S.Ct. at 973 
(Powell, J., concurring). This type of- expansive, 
content-based ordinance restricting speech "tends to 
be invoked only where there is no other valid basis 
for arresting an objectionable or suspicious person. 
The opportunity for abuse ... is self-evident," Id. at 
136, 94 S.Ct. at 974 (Powell, J., concurring). 
FN11. "Speech is often provocative and 
challenging.... [But it] is nevertheless pro-
tected against censorship and punishment, 
unless shown likely to produce a clear and 
present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 
895-96, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). 
[2] Respondent concedes that, as drafted, the sub-
section of the ordinance under which Huber was 
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charged sweeps too broadly to satisfy the first 
amendment. However, it contends, the term 
"abusive language" in the ordinance should be nar-
rowly construed by this court as encompassing only 
"fighting words," thereby avoiding facial invalidity 
of subsection (2)(D) of the ordinance on first 
amendment overbreadth grounds. See Gooding, 405 
U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106; Broadrick v. Ok-
lahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 
L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 
1280, 1284 (Utah), appeal dismissed sub 
nom.Fullmer v. Utah, 464 U.S. 910, 104 S.Ct 266, 
78L.Ed.2d249(1983). 
The court in Conchito v. City of Tulsa, 521 P.2d 
1384 (Okla.Crim.App. 1974), which held facially 
overbroad a municipal ordinance punishing profane 
or obscene language that insulted or offended the 
listener, was similarly called upon to construe the 
language in the challenged ordinance to eliminate 
its application to any protected speech. The court 
declined to do so, recognizing that narrowing the 
express language used by the drafters would 
"exceed *1377 the limits of the judicial reshaping 
of legislative enactments by substantially rewriting 
the ordinance." Id. at 1388; FN12 accord Mussel-
man v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 476, 477 
(Ky.1986) ("[Cjlearly the judiciary lacks power to 
add new phrases to a statute to provide a new 
meaning necessary to render the statute constitu-
tional."). 
FN 12. In contrast, the Oklahoma court re-
cently declined to hold facially overbroad 
an ordinance expressly punishing "abusive 
or violent language" that "disturb[s] the 
public peace or quietude." The court con-
cluded that the latter phrase in the ordin-
ance, as previously construed to require 
conduct that incites violence or tends to 
provoke others to break the peace, was 
within the boundaries set by Chaplinsky 
and later "fighting words" cases. Harring-
ton v. City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700, 701 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1988). 
We are well aware of our responsibility to construe 
statutes and ordinances so as to carry out legislative 
intent while avoiding constitutional defects. See In 
re a Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 
(Utah 1988); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1981); see also Swoboda, 658 S.W.2d at 25. 
However, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its 
plain language in order to reach a constitutional 
construction. Willden, 768 P.2d at 458. In light of 
the municipality's use of the expansive term 
"abusive language" and its express intent to penal-
ize speech that merely annoys, inconveniences, or 
alarms persons who may not even be its targets, un-
restricted by the addressee's likely response, we de-
cline to narrow the scope of Logan City Ordinance 
12-8-9(2)(D) under the guise of judicial construc-
tion. Like the court in Conchito, 521 P.2d at 1388, 
we do not confuse the power to construe with the 
power to legislate. See also Musselman, 705 
S.W.2d at 477. It is for the municipality, not for 
this court, to fashion a narrowly drawn ordinance 
that criminalizes unprotected speech as deemed ne-
cessary by city/ officials. 
Because Logan City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is sus-
ceptible of application to substantial amounts of 
speech which, though perhaps vulgar or insulting, 
are nonetheless protected, it is constitutionally 
overbroad and facially invalid.FN13 The subsection 
may not, therefore, be enforced against Huber or 
anyone else. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 
All U.S. 491, 503-04, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-02, 86 
L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). 
FN13. In light of our disposition of this 
case on the first amendment overbreadth 
issue, we need not reach the other import-
ant issues presented by Huber, including 
his claims that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tionally vague and that, even if narrowly 
construed as punishing only "fighting 
words," the ordinance cannot constitution-
ally be applied to his speech. 
The conviction is reversed. 
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DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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